) exception from the rule against hearsay for statements that subject a declarant to criminal liability. 2 Rule 804(b) (3) reads: The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:... (3) Statement Against Interest. A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. Rule 804(b) (3) "permits the introduction of statements against penal interest-defined as statements tending to subject the declarant to criminal liability." 3 When used as evidence in a criminal trial, these statements may be exculpatory-tending to exonerate the defendant-or inculpatory-tending to implicate the defendant. 4 In Williamson, the Court held that statements against interest are admissible only if they are individually self-inculpatory as to the declarant. 5 In the majority's view, non-self-inculpatory statements (described as collateral statements in the parlance of Rule 804(b) (3)) are not admissible even if the declarant made them within a broader nar-rative that is generally self-inculpatory. 6 Justice Kennedy argued in his concurrence that collateral statements, as well as individual statements against interest, are admissible. 7 This Note argues that the majority correctly adopted a narrow interpretation of Rule 804(b) (3). The Court's approach properly ensures the reliability of statements against interest by focusing on the rationale underlying the rule-that reasonable persons do not make statements against their penal interest unless they believe those statements to be true. 8 
II. BACKGROUND
Hearsay-defined as the in-court repetition of an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted-is not generally admissible as evidence. 9 The rule prohibiting the admission of hearsay reflects concerns about its trustworthiness and reliability.' 0 Unlike in-court testimony, hearsay statements are not usually given under oath or solemn affirmation and are not subject to cross-examination by opposing counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity, and articulateness of the out-of-court declarant.1 In short, hearsay evidence is inadmissible because it is not possible to subject it to incourt procedures designed to ensure the reliability of evidence.
against penal interest, the exceptions for declarations that directly affected the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest form the foundation for Rule 804(b) (3) .
4
Under this exception, common law courts admitted statements if. (1) the declarant was dead; (2) the declaration was against the pecuniary or proprietary interest of the declarant; (3) the declaration was of a fact immediately cognizable by the declarant personally; and (4) the declarant had no motive to falsify the fact declared. 15 Traditionally, courts viewed inculpatory statements against penal interest as unreliable for three reasons. 16 First, the psychological premise that reasonable persons will not make a statement against their penal interest, although perhaps true as a generalization, can break down when applied to a specific individual.' 7 Second, most statements inculpating a defendant are collateral to the portion of the statement that is against the declarant's interest.' 8 Following this argument, the portion of the statement that specifically implicates the defendant is rarely against the declarant's penal interest, thereby weakening the inference that the statement is trustworthy. 19 Third, the declarant may often be motivated either to make false statements to curry favor with the authorities, or to shift or share blame for a crime. 20 Because of these factors, courts at common law were reluctant to expand the rule admitting statements against interest to include inculpatory statements against penal interest. 2 1 In 1913, the Supreme Court, in Donnelly v. United States, 22 adopted the early English precedents against admitting statements against penal interests.
B. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE

804(b) (3)
In 1969, the Advisory Committee to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure completed its first draft of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 2 3 The Committee departed from the common law rule of Donnelly and instituted an exception for statements against penal interest in response to "an increasing amount of decisional law recognizi[ing that] exposure to punishment for crime" was a sufficient guarantor of evidentiary reliability. 2 4 The Committee sided with Justice Holmes' dissent in Donnelly and agreed that the common law's refusal to allow the introduction of any statement against penal interest could not be reconciled with a rule allowing the admission of statements against pecuniary or proprietary interests. 2 5 However, the Committee refused to allow the admission of statements against penal interest that inculpated the defendant, citing their inherent evidentiary unreliability. 26 Pointing out that "statements of codefendants have traditionally been regarded with suspicion because of the readily supposed advantages of implicating another," the Committee explicitly limited the new federal hearsay exception in the last line of the rule: "[T]his example does not include a statement or confession offered against the accused in a criminal case, made by a co-defendant or other person implicating both himself and the accused."
27
When the Supreme Court issued the official draft of the Federal Rules of Evidence, however, it omitted the restriction against inculpatory statements against penal interest from Rule 804(b) (3). The accompanying Advisory Committee Note (Committee Note) explained that such inculpatory statements could qualify as statements against interest within the meaning of the Rule. 28 since it was part and parcel of a larger conversation in which clearly selfincriminating statements were made: "it suffices for admission under that rule that a remark which is itself neutral as to the declarant's interest be integral to a larger statement which is against the declarant's interest." 55 In Lieberman, a prosecution for a conspiracy to distribute marijuana, the Second Circuit addressed the admissibility of two related statements under Rule 804(b) (3). First, the court determined that the declarant's statement that he had packed certain boxes was clearly selfinculpatory because the boxes contained marijuana.
5 6 In the second statement, the declarant admitted that the defendant had told him not to open the door of the storeroom for anyone. 57 Although the court determined that the second statement was less damaging to the declarant, it held that the statement was self-incriminating because it was probative of the declarant's knowledge of the furtive nature of his activities. 58 The court further reasoned that the second statement was admissible because it was "part and parcel" of the larger conversation that was self-inculpatory.
59
Other Courts of Appeals have rejected the "substantially integral" test regarding collateral statements and have instead held that only self-inculpatory statements are admissible.
60 United States v. Lilley involved a prosecution for publishing a forged treasury check. 61 The lower court allowed a federal agent to recount a statement made by the defendant's husband, on the ground that he was unavailable as a witness under spousal immunity. 62 In the statement at issue, the husband admitted to forging a signature on an income tax refund, but also inculpated the defendant (his wife) in the forgery. 63 The Eighth
Circuit reversed the lower court and held that the "small portion of Mr. Lilley's statement which was against his interest should have been excluded absent severability from those portions of the statement inculpating the accused." 64 The court reasoned that the portions of the declarant's statement which inculpated the defendant, but did not tend to subject the declarant to criminal liability (in other words, collateral statements) were not contrary enough to the declarant's inter- Harris consented to a search of the vehicle, during which the deputy sheriff discovered nineteen kilograms of cocaine in two suitcases in the trunk. 6 7 Several items discovered during the search connected Harris with the petitioner, Fredel Williamson. 68 The deputy sheriff found an envelope addressed to Williamson, and a receipt bearing Williamson's girlfriend's address inside the glove compartment. 69 In addition, the suitcases containing the cocaine bore the initials of Williamson's sister, and the car rental agreement listed Williamson as an additional driver.
70
Over the next several hours, the police arrested Harris and interrogated him twice. 71 Shortly after the arrest, Special Agent Donald Walton of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) interviewed Harris by telephone. 72 During that conversation, Agent Walton informed Harris that he would relay any cooperation Harris provided to the prosecuting attorney. 73 After asking whether Agent Walton was recording the call and receiving a negative response, Harris told Agent Walton that he obtained the cocaine from an unidentified Cuban man in Fort Lauderdale and that the cocaine belonged to petitioner Williamson. 74 He further stated that he was supposed to deliver the cocaine to a dumpster in Atlanta later that night. 75 Several hours later, Agent Walton spoke to Harris in person. 76 As in the first interview, Agent Walton told Harris that he would document any cooperation Harris provided and relay it to the prosecu- 
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son. 78 Harris stated that he received the cocaine from a Cuban acquaintance of Williamson, and that the Cuban had put the cocaine in the car with a note telling Harris how to deliver it 7 9 Harris then repeated that he had been instructed to leave the drugs in a certain dumpster, to return to his car, and to leave without waiting for anyone to pick up the drugs. 8 0 Acting on this information, Agent Walton began to arrange a delivery of the cocaine. 8 Harris told Agent Walton that he had lied about the Cuban, the note, and the dumpster. Because Williamson had apparently seen the police searching the car, Harris explained that it would be impossible to make a controlled delivery. Harris told Agent Walton that he had lied about the source of the drugs because he was afraid of Williamson. 87 Although Harris freely implicated himself, he did not want Walton to record his second story, and he also refused to sign a written version of the statement. 8 8 Agent Walton testified that he had promised to report any cooperation by Harris to the Assistant United States Attorney. 8 9 However, Agent Walton testified that he had not promised Harris any reward or other benefit for cooperating. 90 Even though the prosecution gave Harris use immunity, Harris refused to testify when the prosecution called him at Williamson Williamson was convicted of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute, conspiring to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, and traveling interstate to promote the distribution of cocaine. 94 The district court sentenced Williamson to 327 months in prison, followed by five years of supervised release. 95 Williamson appealed his conviction, claiming that the District Court violated Rule 804(b) (3) and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment by admitting Harris' statements. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed without opinion, 9 6 and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the scope of the hearsay exception admitting statements against interest. 
A. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S OPINION
After recanting the history of the case in Part I, Justice O'Connor, in Parts II-A and li-B, set forth a test for determining the admissibility of statements against penal interest and her rationale for adopting this test.' 0 0 Justice O'Connor adopted a narrow interpretation of Rule 804(b) (3) and stated that "the most faithful reading of Rule 804(b) (3) is that it does not allow admission of non-self-inculpatory statements, even if they are made within a broader narrative that is generally self-inculpatory."' 1 0 UnderJustice O'Connor's formulation, only statements that are "individually self-inculpatory" are admissible under Rule 804(b) (3).102 Justice O'Connor's test requires district courts to determine whether a statement is sufficiently individually self-inculpatory, by evaluating whether "a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true," while taking the surrounding circumstances into consideration. The first meaning, "a report or narrative," 10 7 connotes an extended declaration. 1 0 8 Under this definition, Justice O'Connor argued that Harris' entire confession, both the self-inculpatory and non-self-inculpatory parts, would be admissible so long as in the aggregate the confession sufficiently inculpates him. 10 9 Justice O'Connor argued that the second meaning, "a single declaration or remark,"" 0 would suggest that Rule 804(b) (3) covers only those declarations or remarks within a confession that are individually self-inculpatory."' Although Justice O'Connor noted that the text of the Rule does not directly resolve the issue, she concluded that the principle behind the Rule mandated the narrower reading." 2 Justice O'Connor stated that "Rule 804(b) (3) is founded on the common sense notion that reasonable people, even reasonable people who are not especially honest, tend not to make self-inculpatory statements unless they believe them to be true."" 5 Justice O'Connor reasoned that the rationale underlying the rule was not applicable to extended declarations that contained both inculpatory and exculpatory statements, arguing that the mere proximity of non-self-inculpatory words to self-inculpatory words does not guarantee their reliability." 4 Justice O'Connor reasoned further that, "[t]he fact that a person is making a broadly self-inculpatory confession does not make more credible the confession's non-self-inculpatory parts."" 5 She argued, "[o]ne of the most effective ways to lie is to mix falsehood with truth, especially truth that seems particularly persuasive because of its self-inculpatory nature. Because the Court remanded the case to the district court for further factual inquiry into whether Harris' statements were truly selfinculpatory, Justice O'Connor refused to address Williamson's claim that the statements were inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause, and that the hearsay exception for declarations against interest is "firmly rooted" for Confrontation Clause purposes.' 3 3 She also declined to address Williamson's contention that statements inculpating the accused must be supported by corroborating circumstances. 3) is whether a particular remark at issue (and not the extended narraive) meets the standard set forth in the rule. 3 5 Thus, to be admissible, a statement against interest must "so far tend[ ] to subject the declarant to criminal liability that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true." 13 6 Justice Scalia referred strictly to the text of the rule and refused to consider classifications such as "collateral self-serving" and "collateral neutral" in making the determination. Justice Scalia agreed withJustice O'Connor that the Court's holding did not obliterate the penal interest exception to the hearsay rule. 3 8 To show that certain statements, while not a confession to a crime, could be admissible as against the declarant's penal interest, Justice Scalia argued that statements describing events leading up to the commission of a crime would be admissible based on the sur-
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rounding circumstances in which the declarant made the statements. 1 39 Along the same lines, Justice Scalia argued that statements that name another person as a co-defendant are not automatically inadmissible.' 40 However, Justice Scalia clarified that to be admissible, a declarant who names another person as a co-defendant must not have been acting with the intent to minimize liability.
141
C. JUSTICE GINSBURG'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Ginsburg joined in Parts I, II-A, and II-B of the Court's opinion. 14 2 Justice Ginsburg agreed with the Court that Rule 804(b) (3) provides an exception from the general rule that hearsay is inadmissible only for "those declarations or remarks within [a narrative] that are individually self-inculpatory." 143 Justice Ginsburg endorsed this ruling to ensure the reliability of statements implicating another person.'4 However, unlike Justice O'Connor, Justice Ginsburg concluded that the Court of Appeals should not have admitted any of Harris' statements as recounted by Agent Walton.1 45 Justice Ginsburg argued that Harris' "arguably inculpatory" statements were too closely intertwined with his self-serving declarations to be trustworthy.' 40 Justice Ginsburg cited several facts that she felt detracted from the reliability of Harris' statements. First, she concluded that the fact that Harris did not deny the existence of the drugs was not against his penal interest. 14 7 To the contrary, because the police caught Harris red-handed, with enough cocaine to subject him to twelve-and-one-half years of imprisonment, Justice Ginsburg argued that Harris' denial of knowledge would have done little to help him avoid criminal prosecution. 148 Second, Justice Ginsburg noted that many of Harris' statements focused on Williamson's actions to minimize Harris' own role in the crime.
14 9 Third, although Harris admitted that he had previously lied, in his second statement of the facts Harris continued to depict Williamson as the leader of the operation. 50 Justice Ginsburg SUPREME COURT REVEW concluded that, although these statements were incriminatory, they provided only marginal or cumulative evidence of his guilt. 15 1 For these reasons, Justice Ginsburg concluded that she would not have admitted any of Harris' statements.
152 However, because she had not reviewed the entire record, Justice Ginsburg concurred with the Court's judgment to vacate the Court of Appeals' decision. 15 Justice Ginsburg stated that the Government should have the opportunity to argue on appeal that the erroneous admission of the hearsay statements constituted harmless error. 1 54
D. JUSTICE KENNEDY'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Kennedy' 55 agreed with the opinion of the Court and the other concurrences that the rationale behind Rule 804(b) (3) is that people seldom make statements that are damaging to themselves unless they believe the statements to be true. 156 However, in his concurrence, Justice Kennedy framed the issue presented in different terms than the preceding three opinions. According to Justice Kennedy, the issue presented by the case was whether courts may admit "collateral statements" under the exception to the hearsay rule for statements made against interest. 157 Justice Kennedy described "collateral statements" as those related to, but not directly against, the declarant's interest. 158 Because the text of the Rule does not answer the question,Justice Kennedy traced the debate among commentators over the admissibility of collateral statements. 159 Justice Kennedy first cited Dean Wigmore's position in favor of admissibility, which argued that "the statement may be accepted, not merely as to the specific fact against interest, but also as to every fact contained in the same statement." 160 151 Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 152 Id. at 2440 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg also argued that none of Harris' statements were admissible under the exception for statements made by a co-conspirator (Rule 801 (d) (2) (E) According to Justice Kennedy, the Court adopted Jefferson's approach, the strictest interpretation of Rule 804(b) (3). Justice Kennedy rejected the Court's conclusion that the policy of Rule 804(b) (3) precluded the admission of collateral statements. To the contrary, he argued that the existing authorities suggested that some collateral statements were admissible. In support of his argument, Justice Kennedy cited three sources of authority: (1) the Advisory Committee Note; (2) the common law hearsay exception for statements against interest; and (3) the general presumption that Congress does not enact statutes that have no meaning. 64 First, Justice Kennedy argued that the Advisory Committee Note (Committee Note) established that some collateral statements are admissible. He cited the language of the Committee Note as a forthright admission that some collateral statements are admissible. 65 The Committee Note reads:
[o]rdinarily the third-party confession is thought of in terms of exculpating the accused, but this is by no means always or necessarily the case: it may include statements implicating him, and under the general theory of declarations against interest they would be admissible as related statements.
166
Justice Kennedy maintained that where, as here, the text of a rule does not answer a question relative to how courts should apply the rule of evidence, the Court should look to the Committee Note for guidance. 167 Second, Justice Kennedy argued that even if the Committee Note was silent, the Court should not presume that Congress intended to enact legislation in contrast to the existing common law without mak-ing that intent specific. 16 8 Kennedy argued that the Committee Note reflects the existing "general theory" that collateral statements were admissible, and thus is an indication that the Rule followed the common law. 169 Justice Kennedy concluded that, although the Rule is silent on the issue, Congress legislated against the common law background allowing the admission of some collateral statements, and did not intend to give the common law a silent burial. 170 Third, Justice Kennedy argued that the Court's interpretation of the Rule would cause courts to exclude almost all statements inculpating defendants.' 7 ' Justice Kennedy conceded that the Court's decision would allow the rule to apply to a limited number of situations; however, he concluded that it would be rare to find a case in which the precise self-inculpatory words of the declarant would also inculpate the defendant 7 2 Justice Kennedy argued that Congress would not pass a rule that had such a small effect.' 75 Thus, Justice Kennedy concluded that Rule 804(b) (3) allows courts to admit statements that are collateral to the precise words against the declarant's interest. 174 However, to determine whether all collateral statements related to the statement against interest would be admissible under Rule 804(b) (3), Justice Kennedy looked to the Committee Note. 175 Because the Committee Note cites McCormick's treatise, Justice Kennedy concluded that Rule 804(b) (3) excludes selfserving collateral statements, but allows neutral collateral statements.' 76 McCormick states that within a declaration containing both self-serving and disserving parts, he would "admit the disserving parts of the declaration, and exclude the self-serving parts" at least "where the serving and disserving parts can be severed." 177 In addition to excluding collateral, self-serving statements, Justice Kennedy argued that the admissibility of statements made to the authorities should be limited under Rule 804(b) (3) to avoid relying upon statements made to curry favor.' 78 Thus, if a declarant makes a statement in response to a promise of leniency, the statement is admissible.' 79 Justice Kennedy acknowledged that such a rule required judicial dis-cretion. He concluded, however, that judicial line drawing was necessary to avoid excluding all statements made to the police.' 8 0
Finally, justice Kennedy outlined his approach to determine whether courts may admit statements under Rule 804(b) (3). According to Justice Kennedy, a court should first determine whether the declarant made a statement that contained a fact against penal interest. 8 1 If the court makes such a finding, it should admit all statements related to the precise statement against penal interest, subject to two limitations.' 8 2 The court should exclude a collateral statement that is so self-serving as to render it unreliable. 8 3 In addition, in cases where the statement was made under circumstances where it is likely that the declarant had a significant motivation to obtain favorable treatment, the entire statement should be inadmissible.
8 4 Justice Kennedy concluded that the decision is at the discretion of the district court judge and must depend on the circumstances of the case. 185 
V. ANALYSIS
This Note argues that the Supreme Court properly determined that collateral statements (even those that are neutral) do not fall within the scope of Rule 804(b) (3)'s exception to the rule against hearsay for statements against penal interest. In Part A, this Note compares the standards of admissibility announced in the majority opinion and injustice Kennedy's concurrence and applies the varying standards to specific fact patterns to compare and contrast the results derived from each standard. This Note argues that Justice O'Connor's majority approach best reflects the principles underlying Rule 804(b) (3) and adequately ensures the reliability of statements against penal interest. In Part B, this Note discusses some questions the Williamson decision left unresolved and discusses a subsequent case involving statements against interest.
A. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S APPROACH BEST ENSURES THE RELIABILITY OF STATEMENTS ADMITTED UNDER RULE 804(b) (3)
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine the scope of Rule 804(b) (3).186 All of the Justices agreed that clearly self-serving or self-exculpatory out-of-court statements may not qualify as sufficiently 180 Id. at 2445 (Kennedy, J., concurring). against interest to ensure reliability. 187 Similarly, all of the Justices agreed that statements that singly inculpate the declarant are admissible under Rule 804(b) (3).188 The crucial point of contention between the majority approach and Justice Kennedy's concurrence concerned the admissibility of "neutral" or "non-self-inculpatory" statements that are collateral to the precisely self-inculpatory words (collateral statements).189
Justice O'Connor held that Rule 804(b) (3) does not allow the admission of collateral statements. 190 According to the majority approach, to be admissible under Rule 804(b) (3), statements must be sufficiently against the declarant's penal interest "that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true." 191 To determine whether a statement is self-inculpatory, it is necessary to view it in context.
192
Contrary to the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy concluded that Rule 804(b) (3) allows admission of collateral statements. 93 Under Justice Kennedy's approach, a court must first determine whether the statement contains a fact against penal interest. 94 If the court makes such a finding, the court should admit all statements related to the precise statement against penal interest, except statements that are self-serving and statements made to curry favor with the authorities. 19 5 Justice Kennedy also stressed that courts should consider the circumstances of the case in making this determination. 196 To compare the practical consequences of the two standards, it may be helpful to analyze statements under both standards. 98 Justice Kennedy would likely agree that the statement would subject the declarant to criminal liability. Consequently, assuming that the statement was not self-serving, and that the declarant did not make it to curry favor with the authorities, Justice Kennedy would admit the entire statement. 199 In this example, the Justices probably would reach the same conclusion that the entire statement was admissible. This result may not be surprising in light of the fact that all of the Justices were primarily concerned about the same risks in regard to statements against interest-the possibility that the declarant made the statements to curry favor with the authorities and the risk that the declarant made the statements to shift the blame for the crime. Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment because he too believed that the Court should remand the case. 2 08 To determine which portions of Harris' statement would be admissible, Justice Kennedy would first determine whether the statement, presumably as a whole, contained statements against interest. 2 0 9 In this case, the statement meets the first requirement because Harris admitted that he knew cocaine was in the trunk and because he acknowledged his participation in the transportation of drugs.
Next, Justice Kennedy would determine whether Harris' statement was overly self-serving or whether Harris made it to shift the blame for the crime. 2 10 Perhaps Justice Kennedy would not admit the portion of the statement in which Harris stated that he was delivering the drugs for Williamson, fearing that Harris was trying to shift the blame for the crime. However, he might consider the other portions of the statement, in which Harris stated that Williamson was driving in front of him in another car and that Williamson turned around when Harris was pulled over, neutral as to Harris' interest, and therefore admit them as collateral statements. These statements may be considered neutral because they neither appear to minimize the fact that Harris had the drugs in his car nor attempt to describe Williamson as the owner of the drugs. 2 1 ' From this hypothetical application of Justice Kennedy's standard of admissibility under Rule 804(b) (3), it seems that Justice Kennedy would admit a larger portion of the statement than Justice O'Connor.
These comparisons demonstrate that application of the two standards to particular facts may yield different results. The question then becomes which standard creates results consistent with the statutory directive of Rule 804(b) (3) and the policies underlying the rule. Justice O'Connor properly focused her analysis on whether statements collateral to the specific statement against interest have sufficient guarantees of reliability. The general rule against hearsay, that out-ofcourt statements presented at trial to prove the truth of matters asserted are inadmissible, is based on a basic concern for reliability. 212 However, the Federal Rules of Evidence make an exception for out-ofcourt statements that are necessary and bear circumstantial proof of 208 the defendant company filed a civil action, alleging that the defendant had breached a fiduciary duty under ERISA 222 to provide retirement benefits. 223 The relevant issue for Rule 804(b) (3) purposes was whether an affidavit of Mr. Woodend, the retired vice president of the defendant company, was admissible at trial 2 24 The court presented the issue by stating, The issue here is not whether the affidavit contains statements against interest butjust how wide a net the exception casts. Put more succinctly, does the exception render admissible only those portions of sentences that specifically inculpate Mr. Woodend or does it also include the remainders of those sentences, including references to others? 225 The court concluded that Mr. Woodend's affidavit contained statements against interest because in it he essentially admitted that he had 219 Id. 220 Justice Kennedy argues that the following text of the Advisory Committee Note is a "forthright statement that collateral statements are admissible under Rule 804(b) (3)": "[o]rdinarily the third-party confession is thought of in terms of exculpating the accused, but this is by no means always or necessarily the case: it may include statements implicating him, and under the general theory of declarations against interest they would be admissible as related statements." Williamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2442. From this quote, Justice Kennedy seems to conclude that the rationale behind Rule 804(b) (3) applies to collateral statements. On the contrary, the quote merely seems to acknowledge that third-party statements may be used both by the prosecution to inculpate the defendant and the defense to exculpate the defendant depending on the content of the statement against interest. The court in Ciccarelli noted that it could read Williamson in one of two ways:
The first would be that, in a statement of several sentences, some of which are self-inculpatory and some of which are not, the sentences that are self-inculpatory are admissible-even if they contain nonsef-inculpatory references-and the other sentences are not. As an example, in the following statement, the entire second sentence would be admissible under the rule but the first would not be: "Derek purchased the gun. The court in Ciccarelli adopted the second, more narrow, interpretation of Williamson. 229 The court in Ciccarelli stated three reasons why it believed the more narrow interpretation of Williamson was correct. First, because the Supreme Court held that the rationale behind statements against interest did not apply to collateral statements, the court in Ciccarelli concluded that the Supreme Court could not have intended the fortuity of sentence structure to dictate admissibility. 230 The court's opinion in Ciccarelli highlights the portions of the Williamson opinion that may cause confusion. The court properly understood Williamson to permit only those statements that individually inculpate the declarant to be admitted against a defendant under Rule 804(b) (3). However, because the Williamson standard, which defined "statement" as an assertion that is individually self-inculpatory, does not, in and of itself, provide an easily applied standard for lower courts, the court in Ciccarelli determined that for Rule 804(b) (3) purposes "statement" could either refer to a single word or to a larger grammatical unit, such as a sentence. The court in Ciccarelli determined that the Supreme Court intended a narrow analysis under Williamson and therefore determined that only the "words" that are selfinculpatory are admissible against a defendant.
The court properly determined that the Court in Williamson adopted a narrow interpretation of Rule 804(b) (3); however, the court further narrowed the Supreme Court's holding to apply to individually self-inculpatory words. 23 5 Although Justice O'Connor narrowly defined the word "statement" as "a single remark or declaration," 23 6 for Rule 804(b) (3) purposes, she began her analysis by recognizing that the Federal Rules of Evidence define "statement" more generally as "an oral or written assertion." 23 7 Contrary to the court's decision in Ciccarelli, Justice O'Connor did not suggest that "statement" referred to individual words. 238 Instead of focusing on individual words or on sentences (the two options put forth by the court in Ciccarelh), a better approach might be to focus on phrases within the statement. This would coincide with Justice O'Connor's narrow interpretation of Rule 804(b) (3) and would surround admissi- on the character of individual words. Id at 2441 ("For example, in the statement 'John and I robbed the bank,' the words 'John and' are neutral (save for the possibility of conspiracy charges). On the other hand, the statement, 'John, not I, shot the bank teller' is to some extent self-serving and therefore might be inadmissible."). Id.
ble statements with enough context to render them intelligible at trial. By focusing on individual words, courts could edit statements so that they would become meaningless, irrelevant, or both.
9
The court in Ciccarelli ignored or misconstrued other important aspects of the Court's holding in Williamson. First, the court in Ciccarelli suggested that the Court adopted a per se rule against the admissibility of statements against the declarant's interest that also inculpate other persons. 240 As the Ciccarelli decision illustrates, the problems posed by statements against penal interest may cause confusion for parties attempting to implement the exception as well as for courts attempting to determine the admissibility of statements. Practitioners and prosecutors would be wise to note the impact that the 248 See Wi!/iamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2436-37. On this issue, Justice O'Connor stated, Moreover, whether a statement is self-inculpatory or not can only be determined by viewing it in context. Even statements that are on their face neutral may actually be against the declarant's interest. "I hid the gun in Joe's apartment" may not be a confession of a crime; but if it is likely to help the police find the murder weapon, then it is certainly self-inculpatory... And other statements that give the police significant details about the crime may also, depending on the situation, be against the declarant's interest.
Id. (emphasis added).
This language suggests that courts should consider the case as a whole when determining whether a statement is against interest instead of looking solely at the individually selfinculpatory statement in the context of the larger statement. In addition, Justice O'Connor's concern about the risk that the declarant made the statement to curry favor or shift blame suggests that courts must consider the surrounding facts.
249 See Wil/iamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2437 n.1.
